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Recent Statute of Limitations 
Developments in the  
New York Court of Appeals 
 
Jay C. Carlisle II* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
This article analyzes recent developments in the statute of 
limitations case law under New York Civil Practice Law and Rules 
(“CPLR”) Article II1 and two related New York Court of Appeals 
decisions.  Specifically, the article will examine the cases of Bazakos v. 
Lewis
2
 and Gotay v. Breitbart.
3
  In Bazakos, the Court of Appeals held 
that a claim against a doctor for his alleged negligence in performing an 
independent medical examination (“IME”) was governed by the two-year 
and six-month medical malpractice statute of limitations.
4
  In Gotay, the 
Court of Appeals held that the continuous representation doctrine did not 
toll the running of a three-year statute of limitations in a malpractice 
claim against a lawyer.
5
  Both decisions demonstrate the Court of 
Appeals‟ adherence to a strict and rigid application of statutory time 
periods in favor of defendants and against plaintiffs.
6
 
 
*   Jay C. Carlisle is one of the founding professors at Pace University School of 
Law.  He is a Commissioner for the New York State Law Revision Commission, an 
elected Life Fellow of the American Bar Foundation, and a Referee for the New York 
State Commission on Judicial Conduct.  Special thanks to Fallyn Reichert for all of her 
assistance. 
1. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 203 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2009).  Article II of the CPLR 
contains the principle statutes of limitations in New York, although there are many 
others.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. 201, at 2-6 to 21 (McKinney 2004).  See also Jay C. Carlisle, 1991 
Survey of New York Civil Practice, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 77, 101-16 (1992). 
2. Bazakos v. Lewis, 911 N.E.2d 847 (N.Y. 2009). 
3. Gotay v. Breitbart, 912 N.E.2d 1056 (N.Y. 2009). 
4. Bazakos, 911 N.E.2d at 847 (“We hold that a claim against a doctor for his 
alleged negligence in performing an independent medical examination (IME) is a claim 
for malpractice, governed by CPLR 214-a's two-year-and-six-month statute of 
limitations.”). 
5. Gotay, 912 N.E.2d at 1056 (“Plaintiff's legal malpractice claim was not brought 
within the applicable statute of limitations period, and defendants-appellants established 
as a matter of law that the continuous representation doctrine does not apply.”). 
6. It is common knowledge that New York‟s application of statutes of limitations is 
defendant-oriented.  See generally OSCAR G. CHASE & ROBERT A. BARKER, CIVIL 
1
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II.  Statutes of Limitations Generally 
 
A statute of limitations is an arbitrary period of time within which 
an action must be commenced.
7
  If a claim is not brought within the time 
provided, a defendant may assert the statute as a defense.
8
  “Article 2 of 
the CPLR contains the principal statutes of limitations in New York, 
though there are many others.”9  The CPLR also includes two rules of 
general applicability, which are essential for analyzing statutes of 
limitations cases.
10
  The first rule, CPLR 203(a), states that “[t]he time 
within which an action must be commenced, except as otherwise 
expressly prescribed, shall be computed from the time the cause of action 
accrued to the time the claim is interposed.”11  To determine if there is a 
time limit in an action, one must first determine which period set forth in 
CPLR 211-217 (or from another source) is relevant; then determine when 
the claim accrued; and finally, consider the effect of any applicable tolls 
or extensions.
12
  The second rule, CPLR 201, states that, “[n]o court shall 
extend the time limited by law for the commencement of an action.”13  
Thus, courts must often defer to the legislatures‟ judgment as written in 
the statute as to when a particular claim has expired.
14
 
There are fundamental policy goals underlying statutes of 
limitations.  These concerns include notions of fairness,
15
 repose,
16
 
meritorious claims,
17
 stale evidence,
18
 and credibility.
19
  Repose seems to 
be the paramount policy consideration in New York.  This emphasis 
means that, as applied, New York‟s statutes of limitations are often 
defendant-orientated.
20
  The general rule is that the statute starts to run 
 
LITIGATION IN NEW YORK § 7.01 (4th ed. 2002). 
7. DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 33, at 41 (4th ed. 2005). 
8. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(a)(5), 3018(b) (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2009). 
9. See CHASE, supra note 6, § 7.01. 
10. Id. 
11. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 203(a). 
12. The claim is generally interposed when filed. 
13. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 201. 
14. See generally id. 
15. See generally id.; SIEGEL, supra note 7, at 41.  See also Blanco v. Am. Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 689 N.E.2d 506, 514 (N.Y. 1997). 
16. Cubito v. Kreisberg, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578, 581 (App. Div. 1979), aff’d, 415 
N.E.2d 979 (N.Y. 1980). 
17. Victorson v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 335 N.E.2d 275 (N.Y. 1975). 
18. See, e.g., Labarbera v. N.Y. Eye & Ear Infirmary, 691 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1998). 
19. Nykorchuck v. Henriques, 577 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (N.Y. 1991). 
20. See cases cited supra notes 15-19. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/4
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when the wrong is committed, i.e., at the point where the right to sue is 
complete, regardless of whether the person wronged is aware of the 
fact.
21
  However, the legislature may postpone the accrual to the date of 
discovery.
22
  Gotay and Bazakos are legal and medical malpractice cases, 
respectively, where the Court of Appeals reversed lower court decisions 
denying defendants‟ motions to dismiss on statute of limitations 
grounds.
23
  In both cases, the claims accrued, and the statute began to 
run, when the wrong was committed.  In Gotay, the plaintiff argued that 
the three-year time limitation was not applicable because of the doctrine 
of continuous representation.
24
  The Appellate Division for the First 
Department found the doctrine to be applicable,
25
 but it was reversed by 
the Court of Appeals.
26
  In Bazakos, the plaintiff‟s claim was commenced 
two-years and eleven months after it accrued.
27
  The defendant moved to 
dismiss the case on the ground that it was barred by the two-year and six-
month statute of limitations.
28
  The plaintiff argued the claim was 
governed by a three-year general negligence statute, and was, therefore, 
timely.
29
  The Supreme Court granted the defendant‟s motion, relying on 
an Appellate Division, Second Department decision, Evangelista v. 
Zolan.
30
  When the plaintiff appealed, the Appellate Division overruled 
Evangelista and reversed the Supreme Court, holding that the claim was 
 
21. See generally Ely-Cruikshank Co. v. Bank of Montreal, 615 N.E.2d 985, 986 
(N.Y. 1993); Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 429-30 (N.Y. 
1991).  See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. 201 (McKinney 2004); SIEGEL, supra note 7. 
22. Blanco v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 689 N.E.2d 506, 509 (N.Y. 1997). 
23. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B. 
24. Gotay v. Breitbart, 866 N.Y.S.2d 638, 640 (App. Div. 2008), rev’d, 912 N.E.2d 
1056 (N.Y. 2009). 
25. Id. at 640-41.  The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court and applied 
the continuous representation doctrine, stating that “[i]f the attorney-client relationship 
has come to an end, that fact should be absolutely clear to all parties involved.”  Id. at 
641.  The Appellate Division found that where the entire course of litigation had been 
characterized by delay and lack of communication between client and counsel, the 
relationship was not severed and the statute of limitations tolled.  Id. at 642. 
26. Gotay v. Breitbart, 912 N.E.2d 1056 (N.Y. 2009).  A unanimous Court of 
Appeals, without Chief Judge Lippman‟s participation, reversed the Appellate Division in 
a memorandum opinion.  Id. (holding that “[o]n review of submissions pursuant to 
section 500.11 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals (22 NYCRR 500.11), order reversed, 
with costs, motions for summary judgment by defendants-appellants granted and certified 
question answered in the negative.  Plaintiff‟s legal malpractice claim was not brought 
within the applicable statute of limitations period, and defendants-appellants established 
as a matter of law that the continuous representation doctrine does not apply.”).  Id. 
27. Bazakos v. Lewis, 911 N.E.2d 847, 848 (N.Y. 2009). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 849. 
30. Id. at 848-49 (citing Evangelista v. Zolan, 669 N.Y.S.2d 325 (App. Div. 1998)). 
3
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not barred by the statute of limitations.
31
  The Court of Appeals reversed, 
agreeing with the dissenting Justices in the Appellate Division, and 
barred the plaintiff‟s claim as untimely.32 
 
III.  Discussion 
 
A. Bazakos v. Lewis 
 
1.  Background 
 
Injuries sustained in a medical setting may, but usually do not, 
constitute ordinary negligence governed by the three-year, CPLR 214 
general tort statute.
33
  For example, in Bleiler v. Bodnar, the Court of 
Appeals unanimously held that claims against a hospital for failure to 
provide competent emergency room personnel and promulgate proper 
regulations were for claims of negligence and, therefore, subject to a 
three-year limitations period.
34
  Plaintiff James Bleiler had visited the 
emergency room of Tioga General Hospital, seeking treatment for an eye 
injury.
35
  An unidentified nurse took Bleiler‟s medical history and he was 
treated by Dr. Bodnar who failed to detect a metal fragment in Bleiler‟s 
right eye.
36
  The doctor directed him to apply an ointment and wear an 
 
31. Bazakos v. Lewis, 864 N.Y.S.2d 505, 510 (App. Div. 2009). 
32. Bazakos v. Lewis, 911 N.E.2d 847, 848-49 (N.Y. 2009).  The Court explained 
that “[t]he Appellate Division majority concluded that, because the doctor performing an 
[independent medical examination] IME and the person undergoing it do not have a 
physician-patient relationship, the action was not „for medical . . . malpractice‟ (C.P.L.R. 
214-a) and was therefore governed by the three-year statute applicable to personal injury 
actions generally (C.P.L.R. 214[5]).  The dissenting Justices, relying on Evangelista and 
Twitchell v. MacKay, 78 A.D.2d 125, 434 N.Y.S.2d 516 (4th Dept. 1980), argued that a 
„limited‟ physician-patient relationship exists between the examining doctor at an IME 
and the person examined, and that the action should therefore be considered one for 
malpractice . . . .”  Id. 
33. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 2004 and Supp. 2009).  See generally N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. art. 2 (McKinney 2004 and Supp. 2009); SIEGEL, supra note 7. 
34. Bleiler v. Bodnar (Bleiler II), 479 N.E.2d 230, 236 (N.Y. 1985).  The Court of 
Appeals held that a patient‟s claims for negligent medical care were for medical 
malpractice.  Bleiler II, 479 N.E.2d 230.  The Court found that the claims were governed 
by a two and one-half year statute of limitations found in McKinney‟s C.P.L.R. 214-a.  
Id.  However, the claims for failure to provide competent emergency room personnel and 
for failure to promulgate proper regulations sounded in negligence and were, therefore, 
subject to three-year statutes of limitations.  Id. 
35. Bleiler v. Bodnar (Bleiler I), 477 N.Y.S.2d 780, 781 (App. Div. 1984), modified 
and aff’d, 479 N.E.2d 230, 236 (N.Y. 1985). 
36. Bleiler II, 479 N.E.2d at 231. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/4
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eye patch for three days.
37
  The next day, Bleiler had surgery performed 
in a hospital and lost sight in his right eye.
38
  Bleiler‟s action against the 
doctor, nurse, and hospital was commenced two days after the expiration 
of the two-year and six-month statute of limitations for medical 
malpractice.
39
  His claims were against Dr. Bodnar for failure to make a 
proper inquiry regarding Bleiler‟s medical history and in his 
examination, care, and treatment of plaintiff.
40
  The emergency room 
nurse was similarly negligent.
41
  The hospital was charged with vicarious 
liability for the conduct of the doctor and nurse, for failure to provide 
plaintiff with competent doctors and nurses, for failure to promulgate 
rules and regulations regarding the treatment of emergency room patients 
with eye injuries, and for being otherwise negligent.
42
 
Plaintiff‟s complaint was dismissed by the Supreme Court, holding 
that all of Bleiler‟s claims were governed by the two-year and six-month 
medical malpractice statute of limitations.
43
  The Appellate Division 
modified, affirming as time-barred the dismissal of the causes of action 
against the doctor, and the hospital as vicariously liable, but reinstated 
the remaining causes of action.
44
  The Appellate Division granted leave 
to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certified the following question: 
“Did this court err as a matter of law in reversing so much of Special 
Term‟s order as dismissed the direct causes of action against defendant 
hospital and nurse as well as the cause of action against defendant 
hospital for vicarious liability because of the negligence of its employee-
nurse?”45 
The Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge Judith S. Kaye, 
noted that prior to the adoption of the CPLR, actions for medical 
malpractice were governed by a two-year statute of limitations.
46
  
Thereafter, actions for all professional malpractice were subject to a 
three-year limitations period until 1975, when the Legislature responded 
to a crisis in the medical profession by shortening the statute to two-years 
and six-months.
47
  The new legislation provided: “An action for medical 
 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
5
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malpractice must be commenced within two years and six months of the 
act, omission or failure complained of or last treatment where there is 
continuous treatment for the same illness, injury or condition which gave 
rise to the said act, omission or failure.”48  Unfortunately the statute did 
not define the term medical malpractice.  The Court concluded that 
“Bleiler‟s claims for negligent medical care against the hospital directly, 
against the nurse directly, and against the hospital as vicariously liable 
for the conduct of the nurse, [were] for medical malpractice and therefore 
time-barred.”49  However, the Court stated, “Bleiler‟s claims against the 
hospital for failure to provide competent emergency room personnel and 
for failure to promulgate proper regulations, however are for negligence 
and thus timely.”50  The Court warned that “„Medical Malpractice‟ 
should not be read to exclude hospitals sued for negligent treatment 
rendered by their medical personnel. . . . Neither the statute itself nor the 
legislative history explicitly addresses the issue.”51  The Court continued 
by observing that the legislative intent was to minimize a perceived 
threat not only to physicians but to health care providers and, thus, nurses 
and other hospital personal “functioning in th[e] role as an integral part 
of the process of rendering medical treatment to a patient” could take 
advantage of the shorter limitations period.
52
 
In Scott v. Uljanov, the Court of Appeals held that a hospital‟s 
alleged negligent supervisor of an intoxicated patient who fell from an 
emergency room bed should be characterized as medical malpractice 
instead of negligence.
53
  Thus, the plaintiff‟s claim was questionable as 
 
48. Id. at 232. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 232-33. 
52. Id. at 234. 
53. Scott v. Uljanov (Scott II), 541 N.E.2d 398 (N.Y. 1989).  Plaintiff went to the 
hospital‟s emergency room with a .29 blood alcohol level and was subsequently placed in 
a hospital bed with the side rails up.  Id.  Some time later, plaintiff fell while attempting 
to climb out of bed and suffered a laceration to his head.  Id.  Almost three years later, 
plaintiff sued the owner of the hospital and Dr. Uljanov.  Id.  Three causes of action were 
dismissed as time-barred.  Id.  The fourth cause of action, against the hospital only, 
alleged plaintiff was negligently supervised while in the emergency room bed, resulting 
in his fall and head injury.  Id.  The Supreme Court dismissed this claim on the ground it 
was bound by CPLR 214-a, the two-year and six-month statute of limitations for medical 
malpractice actions.  Id.  A divided Appellate Division reversed.  Id.  The majority held 
that the claim sounded in negligence and was subject to a three-year limitations period 
under CPLR 214.  Scott v. Uljanov (Scott I), 528 N.Y.S.2d 435, 437-38 (App. Div. 
1988), rev’d, 541 N.E.2d 398 (1989).  A unanimous Court of Appeals agreed with the 
Appellate Division dissenters that, for purposes of determining the applicable statute of 
limitations, defendant hospitals‟ alleged liability must be characterized as medical 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/4
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to whether services provided by hospital staff constituted medical 
treatment.
54
  The Court found that there was enough medical service to 
“bear[ ] a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment . . 
. by a licensed physician.”55 
In Weiner v. Lenox Hill Hospital, the issue was whether plaintiff‟s 
complaint against a hospital that failed to properly safeguard its blood 
supply from HIV contamination sounds in medical malpractice or 
negligence for purposes of determining whether a two-year and six-
month or three-year statute of limitations applies.
56
  The Court noted 
“that the distinction between medical malpractice and negligence is a 
subtle one, for medical malpractice is but a species of negligence and „no 
rigid analytical line separates the two.‟”57  The Court, speaking through 
Judge Ciparick, stated that “this Court has recognized that although a 
„hospital in a general sense is always furnishing medical care to patients 
not every act of negligence toward a patient would be medical 
malpractice.‟”58  Judge Ciparick concluded that the gravamen of the 
plaintiff‟s claim was the hospital‟s inability to “adopt” and “prescribe” 
sufficient procedures and regulations for the collection of blood, which 
did not implicate questions of medical competence or judgment.
59
  Thus 
the question, “whether the Hospital breached its duty to exercise due care 
in its blood collection activities d[id] not . . . depend on an analysis of the 
medical treatment furnished to Korn.”60 
 
malpractice because the conduct at the hospital was an integral part of the process of 
rendering medical treatment to the plaintiff.  Scott II, 541 N.E.2d at 398-99. 
54. Id.  The Court of Appeals considered the alleged wrongdoing committed by the 
hospital staff‟s failure to place the side rails up to prevent plaintiff‟s fall an “integral part 
of the process of rendering medical treatment.”  Id. at 399.  The Court stated, “[c]onduct 
may be deemed malpractice, rather than negligence, when it „constitutes medical 
treatment or bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a 
licensed physician.‟”  Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Weiner v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 673 N.E.2d 914 (N.Y. 1996).  Dale J. Korn was a 
patient at Lenox Hill Hospital from October 1984 through January 1985 and received 
numerous blood transfusions during his stay.  Id.  One of them was contaminated with the 
HIV virus and he contracted AIDS and died on June 20, 1990.  Id.  In March of 1991, 
plaintiff, as administrator of Korn‟s estate, brought a negligence claim against the 
hospital, which raised an affirmative defense that the claim was time barred under CPLR 
214-a.  Id.  Plaintiff moved to strike the defense, which was granted by the Supreme 
Court because the claim sounded in negligence and not malpractice.  Id.  Both the 
Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Id. at 915. 
57. Id. at 916 (quoting Scott II, 541 N.E.2d at 399). 
58. Id. (quoting Bleiler v. Bodnar, 479 N.E.2d 230, 235 (N.Y. 1985)). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
7
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The Court of Appeals returned to the problem of defining medical 
malpractice in Karasek v. LaJoie, in which it held that actions against 
psychologists and other non-physician mental health professionals were 
not covered by CPLR 214-a.
61
  The Court, speaking through Judge 
Titone, held that a claim of malpractice by a psychologist was not a 
“medical malpractice action” for limitations purposes, and instead was 
governed by a general three-year malpractice statute.
62
  The Court 
reasoned that Bleiler had settled the question of who may be covered by 
the provisions of CPLR 214-a but stated, “the Court‟s holding in that 
case does not address the separate question of what categories of health-
related activity constitute „medical treatment‟ or bear a „substantial 
relationship‟ to the rendition of such treatment.”63  The Court explained 
that the language of CPLR 214-a seemed simple but required courts to 
periodically grapple with what constitutes “„[a]n action for medical 
malpractice‟ as distinguished from one for ordinary negligence or 
another form of professional malpractice by a health care provider.”64  
Thus, the Court deferred to the legislature for clarification and concluded 
that services provided by psychologists, however scientifically based 
they may be, were not medical services within the meaning of CPLR 
214-a.
65
  Finally, the Court was quick to note that its holding did not 
impair the rationale set forth in Bleiler v. Bodnar because, “in general, 
the Bleiler analysis cannot sensibly be applied to the field of mental 
health services—with its variegated diagnostic and treatment methods 
and its diverse group of independent practitioners.”66  Thus, the 
plaintiff‟s claim which was brought within three-years of the last date of 
treatment was timely and not barred by the shorter two-year and six-
month period. 
 
 
61. Karasek v. LaJoie, 699 N.E.2d 889, 890 (N.Y. 1998). 
62. Id. at 890.  Plaintiff‟s action was commenced against a licensed psychologist 
more than two-years and six-months, but less than three-years after the last date of 
treatment.  Id.  The question before the Court of Appeals was whether plaintiff‟s claim 
was for medical malpractice, and therefore time-barred under CPLR 214-a, or for 
negligence under CPLR 214.  Id.  The Court “[c]onclud[ed] that the professional services 
rendered to plaintiff by defendant [ ] were not medical in character for purposes of 
determining the appropriate limitations period, we hold that the CPLR 214(6) three-year 
period . . . is applicable and that, consequently, the action is timely.”  Id. at 889. 
63. Id. at 891. 
64. Id. at 890. 
65. Id. at 892. 
66. Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/4
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2.  IME Exams and the Bazakos Case 
 
In Bazakos v. Lewis, the Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge 
Robert Smith, reversed the Appellate Division in a four to three 
decision.
67
  The Court held that plaintiff‟s independent medical 
examination (“IME”) is a claim for malpractice, governed by the two-
year and six-month statute of limitations of CPLR 214-a.
68
 
Plaintiff had brought a previous action arising out of an automobile 
accident.
69
  In that action, he was required to undergo an examination by 
a doctor designated by the adverse party.
70
  That doctor examined 
plaintiff and allegedly injured him when he “took plaintiff‟s head in his 
hands and forcefully rotated it while simultaneously pulling.”71  Bazakos 
filed his claim approximately two-years and eleven-months after the 
IME, and the defendant moved to dismiss on statute of limitations 
grounds.  The trial court granted the motion, but the Appellate Division 
for the Second Department reversed, granting leave to appeal and 
certifying the question of whether its order was properly made.  The 
Court of Appeals stated, “[w]e answer the question in the negative and 
reverse.”72  Judge Smith summarized the plaintiff‟s argument, which the 
Appellate Division accepted, as a simple one:
73
 the fact that Bazakos was 
not the doctor‟s patient meant there was not a physician-patient 
relationship, which was essential to a cause of action in malpractice.
74
  
Judge Smith admitted there “is some logic to Bazakos‟s position, but the 
result he seeks would be an arbitrary one.”75  He agreed with the 
dissenting Justices at the Appellate Division that there was a “limited 
 
67. Bazakos v. Lewis, 911 N.E.2d 847, 853 (N.Y. 2009). 
68. Id. at 850.  See also Rowe v. Wahnow, 891 N.Y.S.2d 584 (App. Term 2009).  
The Appellate Term described the “acronym” IME as having several meanings within the 
jurisprudence of New York.  Id. at 586 (McKeon, P.J., dissenting).  “The most common 
involves the typical personal injury lawsuit, where a party has, by virtue of statute and 
court rule (see CPLR 3102 (a); 22 NYCRR 202.17), the right to have an alleged injured 
person examined by a physician of one‟s choosing for purposes of providing testimony at 
trial, usually to place at issue the extent and severity of claimed injuries.”  Id.  The 
Appellate Term went on to explain that “the independent prong of the term, has long been 
winked at by the bench and bar” because the exam is not independent but part of the 
adversarial process.  Id. 
69. Id. at 848. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 849. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
9
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physician-patient relationship,” which meant that the general three-year 
statute of limitations for negligence could not apply.
76
 
Chief Judge Lippman dissented.  He observed that the complaint 
sounded in ordinary negligence and noted that, “it is plain that no 
medical treatment was intended or in fact provided.  The exam was 
conducted simply as a disclosure device in litigation and, indeed, one 
whose benefit inured not to the examinee but to the examinee‟s 
adversary.”77  Chief Judge Lippman explained that there was no medical 
treatment rationale or application and that his analysis was entirely 
consistent with the purpose of CPLR 214‟s abbreviated limitations 
period.
78
  He observed, “[the defendant] had no medical duty 
competently to diagnose, inform or, indeed, to treat the subject of his 
exam.”  This meant there was an extraordinarily limited scope of duty 
which was not worthy of a shorter limitation‟s period.  Chief Judge 
Littman found the majority‟s embrace of the troubling notion that there 
may be medical malpractice in the absence of medical treatment as 
merely a form of words creating an exception for doctors hired to 
perform IME‟s when they are not statutorily entitled to the protection 
reserved to those engaged in the delivery of medical care and treatment. 
The Bazakos decision is another example of the broad discretion 
courts have in the interpretation and application of arbitrary statute of 
limitations periods.
79
  Arguably there was no medical treatment 
performed on the plaintiff who was required by his adversary to attend 
the independent medical examination.  These exams are paid for and 
usually controlled by legal adversaries of the person being examined. 
They are not occasions for medical treatment, but are used to contest the 
examinee‟s claims and to question the need for any treatment at all.  In 
fact, the American Board of Independent Medical Examiners has 
admonished the examiner to “advise the examinee that no treating 
physician-patient relationship will be established.”80  Furthermore, 
pursuant to the Court of Appeals‟ decision in Weiner v. Lenox Hill 
Hospital, the distinction between medical malpractice and negligence is a 
subtle one and clearly not every act of negligence towards a patient is 
 
76. Id. at 850. 
77. Id. at 851 (Lippman, C.J., dissenting). 
78. Id. 
79. See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. art. 2 (McKinney 2004 and Supp. 2009); SIEGEL, 
supra note 7; CHASE, supra note 6, at § 7.05. 
80. See American Board of Independent Medical Examiners, Guidelines of 
Conduct, http://abime.org/node/21 (last visited July 31, 2010). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss4/4
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medical malpractice.
81
  In Bazakos, there was negligence and not 
malpractice because a doctor-patient relationship never existed.
82
 
Bazakos subjective state of mind was crucial.  He was instructed by his 
counsel to attend the independent medical exam at the request of his 
adversary.  If he did not attend he could be required to do so by court 
order.  At the examination he did not believe his physical condition was 
being treated.  This is similar to the fact pattern in Payette v. Rockefeller 
University, where the Appellate Division for the First Department held 
that medical procedures performed by physicians sounded in negligence 
and not malpractice because the patient was not seeking diagnosis or 
treatment but was participating in a study.
83
  The same rationale applied 
to Bazakos, who did not seek medical treatment, but who attended the 
independent medical exam pursuant to a disclosure request by his 
adversary.  There was no physician-patient relationship.  Finally, a 
careful reading of CPLR 214-a indicates that it was never intended to 
apply to independent medical examinations.
84
  The statute was created to 
provide limitations for certain forms of professional malpractice which 
are six months shorter than the ordinary personal injury statute.  It was 
part of a package of legislation passed in 1975 in response to a crisis in 
the medical profession.  The purpose of the legislative package was to 
enable health care providers to obtain malpractice insurance rates at 
reasonable prices.  The statute was not intended to protect professionals 
who are not engaged in providing medical treatment to patients.  The 
Court of Appeals made this clear in the Weiner and Bleiler decisions.
85
  
This precedent was not followed or distinguished by the Bazakos Court.
86
 
 
81. 673 N.E.2d 914 (N.Y. 1996). 
82. See Korda v. Sosner, 2009 WL 2568180 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2009). 
83. 643 N.Y.S.2d 79 (App. Div. 1996).  The Court held that since the plaintiff has 
not “alleged or relied upon the existence of a patient-physician relationship or asserted 
that [the defendant‟s] wrongful conduct constituted medical treatment or was 
substantially related to the same, her action does not sound in medical malpractice.”  Id. 
at 82. 
84. See Spiegel v. Goldfarb, 889 N.Y.S.2d 45 (App. Div. 2009).  The Court stressed 
that the distinction between conduct that may be negligence or malpractice depends on 
the nature of the duty defendant is alleged to have breached.  Id.  Thus, the negligence of 
a defendant is not medical malpractice unless it can be characterized as a “crucial element 
of diagnosis and treatment” and “an integral part of the process rendering medical 
treatment to the plaintiff.”  Id. at 47. 
85. Weiner v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 673 N.E.2d 914 (N.Y. 1996); Bleiler v. Bodnar 
(Bleiler II), 479 N.E.2d 230, 236 (N.Y. 1985).  See also Pacio v. Franklin Hosp., 882 
N.Y.S.2d 247 (App. Div. 2009). 
86. See Korda, 2009 WL 2568180.  In resolving a similar issue, the Federal district 
court, citing Bazakos v. Lewis, explained that “New York courts have generally 
concluded that no patient-physician relationship arises from an IME” and stressed that the 
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B. Gotay v. Breitbart 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The CPLR imposes a three-year limitations period on “an action to 
recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental, or podiatric 
malpractice.”  This is true whether the claim is based in contract or tort.87  
Just as medical malpractice cases are subject to the continuous treatment 
doctrine, so are other forms of professional malpractice claims subject to 
the doctrine of continuous representation.
88
  Under this doctrine, an 
action against a professional may be tolled until both parties to the 
relationship unequivocally understand that the relationship giving rise to 
the harm has terminated.  The Court of Appeals explained the doctrine‟s 
rationale in McCoy v. Feinman
89
 with respect to a claim for legal 
malpractice: “The continuous representation doctrine tolls statutes of 
limitations . . . where there is a mutual understanding of the need for 
further representation on the specific subject matter underlying the 
 
jurisprudence “where the claim derives from conduct during an IME, is evolving.”  Id. at 
*5 n.4.  The Bazakos Court did not examine or cite cases referred to by Judge Daniels 
and thus left lower courts with a less than logical rationale as to why an IME negligence 
claim should be subject to a three-year negligence statute of limitations or a two-year-
and-a-half medical malpractice statute of limitations. 
87. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214(6) (McKinney 2004 and Supp. 2009); Chase Scientific 
Research, Inc. v. NIA Group Inc., 749 N.E.2d 161 (N.Y. 2001) (defining “professional” 
for non-medical malpractice statute of limitations purposes as excluding insurance agents 
and brokers); SIEGEL, supra note 7. 
88. SIEGEL, supra note 7.  See also Booth v. Kriegel (Booth II), 825 N.Y.S.2d 193 
(App. Div. 2006).  The lower court held that an accountant who prepared Federal and 
New York State income tax returns for plaintiff for each year from 1969 through 2001 
could not face liability for mistakes he made in the tax returns for more than three years 
prior to the date plaintiff filed her claim for malpractice.  Booth v. Kriegel (Booth I), 
2005 WL 6234607 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 28, 2005), rev’d, 825 N.Y.S.2d 193 (App. Div. 
2006).  The Appellate Division noted that because of the accountant‟s negligence, 
plaintiff unnecessarily paid social security taxes from 1985 through 1998 totaling about 
$150,000.00.  Booth II, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 195.  The lower court held that a “repeated use 
of an improper accounting method and the repeated failure to disclose the risks associated 
with the same,” triggered the continuous representation doctrine.  Booth I, 2005 WL 
6234607.  The First Department reversed the lower court, distinguished prior case law, 
and held that the Plaintiff could not benefit from the doctrine of continuous 
representation.  Booth II, 825 N.Y.S.2d 193.  The Appellate Division reasoned that 
plaintiff did not allege that the error in one year‟s tax return was the cause of the error in 
the return for the next year, only that the same error was repeated year after year.  Id.  
Such repetition of the same error in preparing successive tax returns was, standing alone, 
insufficient to warrant application of the continuous representation doctrine.  Id. 
89. 785 N.E.2d 714 (N.Y. 2002). 
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malpractice claim.”90  The underlying purpose of the continuing 
representation toll is “to avoid undermining the continuing trust 
developing between a professional and his or her client or patient.”91 
Application of the doctrine requires that the plaintiff prove there is a 
professional relationship which pertains specifically to a matter in which 
there was malpractice.  The specificity requirement is rigid.  Thus, in 
McCoy v. Feinman, the Court of Appeals declined to apply the doctrine 
when the malpractice causing injury was the defendant‟s failure in 
connection with a specific stipulation and judgment and the parties did 
not contemplate further representation on that matter.
92
  The Court 
distinguished the McCoy rationale in Zorn v. Gilbert, where a client sued 
her former attorney for negligence in handling a divorce case.
93
  The 
Court, modifying a decision by the Appellate Division for the Second 
Department, reiterated that “[t]he continuous representation doctrine tolls 
the statute of limitations . . . where there is a mutual understanding of the 
need for further representation on the specific subject matter underlying 
the malpractice claim.”94  Therefore, even though the judgment of 
divorce in the underlying action was entered more than three years 
before commencement of the malpractice claim, defendant continued to 
represent the plaintiff in the matrimonial action for another seven 
months, making the commencement of her malpractice action within 
three years of that date timely under CPLR 214(6).
95
  The Court also 
applied the doctrine in Shumsky v. Eisenstein against an attorney who 
had allowed his client‟s claim to languish until it was barred by the 
statute of limitations.
96 
 The Court stressed that the record established 
that the plaintiffs had a reasonable impression that the defendant attorney 
was, in fact, actively addressing their legal needs.
97
  Similarly, in 
Williamson v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP,
98
 the Court of Appeals, for 
the first time, analyzed the continuous representation doctrine in an 
accountant malpractice action.  The action was brought more than three 
years after a number of audits had been completed and reviewed by the 
 
90. Id. at 722. 
91. Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 750 N.E.2d 67, 71 (N.Y. 2001).  See also Jay C. 
Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1988 Survey of N.Y. Law, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 77, 116-17 
(1989). 
92. 785 N.E.2d 714 (N.Y. 2002). 
93. 866 N.E.2d 1030 (N.Y. 2007). 
94. Id. at 1031. 
95. Id. 
96. 750 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 2001). 
97. Id. 
98. 872 N.E.2d 842 (N.Y. 2007). 
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client.  The Court did not apply the doctrine because the parties had 
entered into annual agreements for the provision of separate and discrete 
audit services.
99
  The defendant performed each of them for a particular 
year and no further work for that year was undertaken.
100
  The plaintiff 
demonstrated that there was a continuing professional relationship, but 
there was no course of representation with respect to the specific 
problems giving rise to the plaintiff‟s malpractice claim.  Thus, there was 
not a mutual understanding between the parties as to the continuous 
representation doctrine.
101
 
 
2.  The Gotay Case 
 
Plaintiff sought to recover for the malpractice of her former 
attorneys in connection with a medical malpractice action that she had 
filed.
102
  The question was whether the legal malpractice action was time 
barred.  The medical malpractice action arose from injuries plaintiff 
allegedly sustained in August of 1977, during her birth.
103
  In early 1978, 
plaintiff‟s mother retained a law firm that commenced a malpractice 
claim in April of the same year.
104
  After a long period of inactivity in the 
litigation, plaintiff substituted defendant Breitbart as her attorney.
105
  Her 
case passed through a series of lawyers in connection with the 
defendant‟s law firm, and in 1998, plaintiff was advised that the lawyers 
could no longer represent her because an index number had not been 
filed.
106
  The Appellate Division of the First Department, speaking 
through then-Presiding Justice Jonathan Lippman, rejected defendants 
statute of limitations defense and found plaintiff‟s claim timely because 
of the continuous representation doctrine.
107
  Justice Lippman, relying on 
Shumsky v. Eisenstein,
108
 explained that there was no indication in the 
record that defendants told plaintiff that their legal representation had 
definitely concluded.
109
  Justice Lippman stated, “[t]here is no room for 
uncertainty on these matters, especially where, as here, attorneys deal 
 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. 866 N.Y.S.2d 638 (App. Div. 2009). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. 750 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 2001). 
109. Gotay, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 641. 
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with laypersons unversed in the nuances and intricacies of legal practice 
and expression; what may seem crystal clear to a lawyer may be utterly 
lost upon the client.  If the attorney-client relationship has come to an 
end that fact should be absolutely clear to all parties involved.”110  
Presiding Justice Lippman reasoned that, absent CPLR 321, reasonable 
notice to the client when withdrawing from representation, the lawyer-
client relationship had not ended.
111
  He stressed that the Court of 
Appeals had made it clear that the attorney-client relationship be set 
down clearly and that an attorney must provide reasonable notice to the 
client when withdrawing from the representation to avoid causing the 
client to be misled and prejudiced.
112
  Presiding Justice Lippman 
concluded that since the parties‟ expert witnesses disagreed as to whether 
the attorney-client relationship had ended, there were fact issues that 
warranted affirming the Supreme Court‟s decision to deny the 
defendant‟s summary judgment motion.113 
Justice Friedman dissented in part because the plaintiff, in opposing 
defendants‟ summary judgment motion, had submitted no evidence to 
controvert defendant‟s contention that the lawyer-client relationship had 
ended.
114
  He stated that “[t]he uncontroverted record evidence 
establishes that, here, plaintiff was „informed‟ and „put on notice‟ that 
the HHM defendants were withdrawing from her representation more 
than three years before she commenced this lawsuit.”115  Justice 
Friedman ignored defendant‟s failure to comply with CPLR 321116 and 
called the majority‟s position “illogical” and “astonishing.”117  He 
concluded, 
 
[i]n sum, the inescapable conclusion is that plaintiff‟s 
attorney client relationship with defendants ended on 
January 28, 1999, at the latest, and any toll of the statute 
of limitations ended on that day as well.  Thus, the 
action was untimely when plaintiff commenced it on 
 
110. Id. 
111. Gotay, 866 N.Y.S.2d 638. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 643 (Friedman, J., dissenting).  However, the burden here is on the 
defendant and not the plaintiff. 
115. Id. at 649. 
116. CPLR 321 sets forth the required procedure for substitution of counsel.  N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 321 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2009). 
117. Gotay, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 650 (Friedman, J., dissenting). 
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January 31, 2002, more than three years later.
118
 
 
The Court of Appeals, without discussion or analysis, issued a brief 
memorandum opinion reversing the Appellate Division and dismissing 
the plaintiff‟s claim because it was time barred by the statute of 
limitations.
119
  The Court did not distinguish Shumsky v. Eisenstein, did 
not analyze or clarify the continuous representation doctrine, and failed 
to provide guidance to the bench and bar as to when the doctrine should 
be applicable in legal malpractice cases.  The Court restrictively applied 
the doctrine, adopting the Appellate Division‟s dissent, which used an 
objective standard for determining when the attorney-client relationship 
ends.  This standard is contrary to the traditional subjective test used in 
professional responsibility matters.
120
  In addition, the Court did not deal 
with the dissent‟s claim that that the Appellate Division majority had 
distorted the evidence and relied on reasoning not raised by the parties in 
their Appellate Briefs.  Thus, the Court left the bench and bar with little 
guidance as to when the continuous representation toll should be applied 
in legal malpractice cases. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
The Court of Appeals‟ recent holdings in Bazakos v. Lewis and 
Gotay v. Breitbart, represent the Court‟s continued deference to 
considerations of repose, which usually benefit defendants.  Statutes of 
limitations are enacted by legislatures and frequently are arbitrary and 
without rhyme or reason.  The harsh results of applying these statutes to 
extinguish meritorious claims are sometimes ameliorated by the 
continuous representation doctrine and by classifying certain claims as 
negligence instead of medical malpractice.  The extent to which courts 
fail to balance policy considerations of repose against fundamental 
notions of due process and fairness means that until the Legislature does 
so, many meritorious plaintiffs‟ claims will be dismissed because they 
are time barred. 
 
 
118. Id. at 651. 
119. Gotay v. Breitbart, 912 N.E.2d 1056 (N.Y. 2009). 
120. See Ilene Sherwyn Cooper, The Relationship Between Attorney and Client, 
243 N.Y. L.J. 43 (Mar. 8, 2010) (“Because of the sanctity of the attorney-client 
relationship and the trust and confidence it naturally engenders, it is closely scrutinized 
by the courts in order to insure that no unfair advantage is taken by one party over the 
other….”). 
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